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17 January 1958

NOTES FOR MEETING WITH GENERAL TWINING

1. It seemed to me that the President left absolutely no doubt that whatever overflights he authorized were to be performed by AQUATONE. We have ample experienced pilots and probably enough aircraft to support a very substantial effort.
2. I received the clear impression that the President definitely authorized overflights to cover all the target areas on the map placed before him, subject only to the following limitations:
 - a. If one or more of the most remote areas could not be reached with RAINBOW covered aircraft, these should perhaps be omitted.
 - b. A shallow penetration overflight should be carried out shortly prior to the commencement of a major program to test Russian interception capabilities.
 - c. The program of overflights should be carefully planned.
3. General Twining argued for a large-scale and intensive effort concentrated in a short period of time. The President seemed to view this approach favorably but did not specifically direct that it be followed. I believe this approach has the following serious limitations:
 - a. Weather will rarely permit more than two or at the most three missions on the same day and will practically never permit more than five or six missions in a single week, provided we wait for really good weather as we most certainly should.
 - b. I am convinced that multiple missions on a given day or intensive activity over a period of one or two weeks are far more provocative than operations at the pace of two or three a week which we have achieved in the past.

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c. One of the major purposes of the forthcoming operations is to search for operational missile sights under construction. There is a real advantage in spreading our operations over a considerable period of time so as to increase the chances of observing this activity.

4. If intensive operations compressed into a short period of time are to be undertaken, it will be almost essential (as stated yesterday) to wait until April or May so as to maximize the number of clear days likely to occur within a two-week period. Such a delay in commencing operations seems to me most undesirable for at least two reasons:

a. The requirement for coverage of certain of the high priority targets has a high degree of time urgency.

b. The risk that the Russians will reveal an effective interception capability increases with every passing day.

5. Recommendation: Our position on the foregoing matters should be:

a. That we have permission to proceed with operations against all target areas reachable with RAINBOW-covered aircraft without further reference to higher authority.

b. That we will begin operations against the three highest priority target areas as soon as equipment and weather permit.

c. That missions over the northerly targets or over areas with difficult-to-predict weather will be postponed until spring.

d. That in all cases we will wait for really promising weather over specific targets before securing coverage thereof.

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